THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
time when the effects of patent abuse have been dramatized,33 it is not too
much to hope for an automatic rule remedying illegal extension of the patent
franchise by declaring the abused patents unenforceable.

REFUSAL TO SIGN IMMUNITY WAIVER AS "CONDUCT
UNBECOMING AN OFFICER"
Two police officers, Lieutenant Drury and Captain Connelly, assigned by the
Chicago police department to investigate a shooting, were instrumental in securing signed statements from three persons who testified that they could identify the gunmen. The police officers testified fully before the grand jury, which
subsequently returned indictments against suspects identified by the supposed
eyewitnesses obtained by the officers. Two weeks later, however, two of the
three witnesses repudiated their testimony. Once again the officers were called
before the grand jury. This time they were asked to sign waivers of immunity,
and thus relinquish, before being questioned, the constitutional privilege that
"no person shall be compelled in any criminal case to give evidence against
himself... ."x Apparently fearing indictment, Drury and Connelly refused to
sign the waivers and were dismissed without questioning. An indictment was
returned charging the two officers with conspiracy to procure a false indictment.
Later it was nolle prossed by the State's Attorney. The Chicago commissioner
of police, however, filed charges against them with the Civil Service Commission, which ordered the officers dismissed from the force for "conduct unbecoming an officer. ' ' 2This order was reversed by the Superior Court of Cook County.3
An appeal is now pending before the Supreme Court of Illinois.
(1829); see United States v. Masonite Corp., 36 U.S. 265 (1942). See also Brief for the
United States in United States v. National Lead Co., 67 S.Ct. 1634 (1947). It may be argued
that the Government has no need of such relief since the patent is already effectively unenforceable under the doctrine of the Morton Salt and Mercoid cases. Private infringers themselves may raise the defense of the tying clauses. But see the clarifying opinion of Justice
1

Robertsin Hartford-Empire Co. v. United States, 324U.S. 570, 572 (1945). At the present time

it may well be that a private infringer is in a worse position as a result of a successful antitrust action by the Government, since the decree is considered to have wiped out the past
abuses. See Standard Oil Co.v. Markham, 6i F. Supp. 813 (N.Y., 1945).
33 During the war years, the popular press was filled with stories of patent abuse, cartelization, and the consequent sapping-of our military potential. For a general account, see Berge,
Cartels: Challenge to a Free World (i944); Reimann, Patents for Hitler (194,2); No Peace with
I. G. Farben, 26 Fortune io5 (Sept. 1942).
1 Ill. Const. Art. 2, § io. Compare U.S. Const. Amend. 5: "No person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself ......
2 In Matter of Thomas E. Connelly, Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago,

Case No. H 4789 (x947); In Matter of William J. Drury, Civil Service Commission of the
City of Chicago, Case No. H 4790 (947).
3 Connelly and Drury v. Hurley, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, Case Nos.
47-S-17720, 47-S-1772I

(948).

RECENT CASES
The constitutional privilege of refusal to testify as to incriminating matters,
incorporated into the United States Constitution in 1791,4 has since been
adopted in all but two of the state constitutions.s It may be asserted in grand
jury proceedings, 6 but it will be allowed only where the witness shows that his
testimony may subject him to criminal prosecution.7 The Civil Service Commission found that Drury and Connelly had reasonable grounds for believing that
their testimony might subject them to criminal prosecution; thus their exercise
of the privilege was justified.8 But assertion of this privilege may directly conflict with a police officer's duty, as a public servant, to assist in the prosecution
of crime.
The Illinois Civil Service Act provides: "Any appointing authority may remove, discharge or demote any officer or employee in the classified civil service
of the State for'just cause. The term 'just cause' as herein used means any cause
which is detrimental to the public service."9 The assertion by a policeman of the
privilege not to testify should be deemed sufficiently detrimental to the public
interest to constitute just cause for removal from office.
The earliest case in which exercise of a constitutional right was held inconsistent with a public officer's duties was McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford."'
There a policeman sought reinstatement after removal from office, under a police
department rule, for political canvassing and vote soliciting. The court upheld
removal, saying through justice Holmes: "The petitioner may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be a policeman.
There are few employments for hire in which the servant does not agree to
suspend his constitutional rights of free speech, as well as of idleness, by the
implied terms of his contract. The servant cannot complain, as he takes the
employment on the terms which are offered him."' This doctrine was reasserted in Christalv. Police Commissionerof San Francisco,' 2 where the petitioners
had been discharged as police officers for refusal to testify before a grand jury
on corruption charges. The California court pointed out that a public servant's
4U.S. Const. Amend. 5. Compare note 2 supra. For an excellent discussion of this privilege,
see 8 Wigmore, Evidence §§ 225o-84 (3d ed., 194o).
s Iowa and New Jersey.
6United'States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547
(1892); People v. Spain, 307 Ill.
283, 138 N.E. 614 (1923); People v. Argo, 237 Ill.
173, 86
N.E. 679 (i9o8).
7 Graham v. United States, 99 F. 2d 746 (C.C.A. 9th, 1938); O'Connell v. United States,
4o F. 2d 201 (C.C.A. 2d, i93o), cert. granted 281 U.S. 716 (i93o), cert. dismissed 296 U.S.
667 (1930).

8In Matter of William J. Drury, Civil Service Commission of the City of Chicago, Case
No. H 4790, p. 7 (i947).
9Ill.
Rev. Stat. (1947) c. 24J, § 14.
10155 Mass. 26, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
11Ibid., at 220, 517-18.
1 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 92 P. 2d 416 (1939).
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right to retain office should depend upon willingness to forego constitutional
rights and privileges to the extent that their exercise would be inconsistent with
the performance of official duties.
The Christalcase also held that the refusal of a police officer to testify before
a grand jury constituted "conduct unbecoming an officer":
Such officers are the guardians of the peace and security of the community, and the
efficiency of our whole system, designed for the purpose of maintaining law and order,
depends upon the extent to which such officers perform their duties and are faithful
to the trust reposed in them .... [I]t is a violation of such duties for any police officer
to refuse to disclose pertinent facts within his knowledge even though such disclosure
may show, or tend to show, that he himself has engaged in criminal activities."3
This conclusion is buttressed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Souder
v. City of Philadelphia.14There the court held that a police captain whose testimony before the grand jury was unsatisfactory, and who later refused to testify
before the Civil Service Commission, was guilty of "conduct unbecoming an
officer."
The Superior Court of Cook County attempted to distinguish the Christal
case on the ground that the officers refused at all times to testify, while Drury
and Connelly did testify before the Civil Service Commission and when first
called before the grand jury."s But the policy requirements enunciated in the
Christal case should not be considered completely satisfied by past or subsequent performance of duty. Moreover, Drury and Connelly had no reason to
fear prosecution and were not asked to sign a waiver when they first appeared
before the grand jury, since the witnesses had not at that time changed their
testimony.
The court also sought to reconcile the present case with the Christal and
Sauder decisions by pointing out that neither of the earlier cases had involved
the precise question of refusal to sign an immunity waiver, but rather a refusal
to testify. This distinction seems to be without force. An individual might refuse to sign a waiver of immunity and still, when called upon to testify, choose
not to assert his constitutional privilege. Thus the refusal to sign a waiver may
be called not an exercise of the privilege but a reservation of the right to assert
the privilege. But such a reservation by a public officer is as reprehensible as the
13 Ibid., at 419, 567-68. See also Scholl v. Bell, 125 Ky. 750, 796, 102 S.W. 248, 261-62
(1907): "The principle under discussion is a rule of evidence, to protect the witness from criminal prosecution.... Its use should not be considered as affording a witness a certificate of
good character. Here were police officers being interrogated as to the existence of crimes they
were paid to prevent, if possible; if not to expose and punish afterwards; and yet they one and
all refused to answer.... Suppose a secret murder had been committed, and the police on the
beat, when asked about it, should say, 'I decline to answer for fear of incriminating myself.'
This, under the rule invoked, would protect the witness from answering; but how long would
it justify his retention on the roll of police?"
14 305 Pa. I, 156 Atl. 245 (1931).
isConnelly and Drury v. Hurley, Superior Court of Cook County, Illinois, Case Nos.
47-S-I7720, 47-S-I772I (1948).
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exercise of the privilege itself, since he should be willing to make full disclosure
of all matters concerning his office. If he refuses to sign a waiver he is, of course,
manifesting a disinclination to testify fully.
The strength of the policy asserted in the Christaland Souder cases was recognized in New York by an amendment to its constitution in 1939:
No person shall... be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, providing, that any public officer who, upon being called before a grand jury to
testify concerning the conduct of his office or the performance of his official duties, refuses to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to
answer any relevant question concerning such matters before such grand jury, shall be
removed from office by the appropriate authority .... A
This provision was held in Canteline v. McClellanZ7to apply to police officers who
refused to sign an immunity waiver when called to testify before a grand jury as
8
to their conduct in office.'
In rejecting the theory underlying the opposing authorities, the present court
relied strongly on In re Holland,'9where a municipal court judge refused to sign
an immunity waiver when questioned about the murder of a former business
associate. On recommendation of the Chicago Bar Association, an action was
instituted to suspend his attorney's license for two years. But the Illinois
Supreme Court held that the exercise of the privilege did not justify suspension.
While the case is a strong precedent in Illinois for the view that failure to sign an
immunity waiver is not sufficient grounds for removal, it should not determine
the result in the instant case. In the Holland case, the action was brought against
Holland as an attorney and not as a judge.2 ° An attorney is not a public officer
in the same sense as a policeman. The court itself made this distinction: "It can
scarcely be said that the duty resting upon a lawyer to assist in the investigation
of crime, a duty with which he is generally though not specifically charged, as is
a policeman, outweighs ... his moral as well as his legal right to claim the constitutional privilege ....

"2

In referring to the Christal and Souder cases, the

court asserted that in those cases the officers were especially charged with a duty
to disclose evidence which would assist in the apprehension of criminals.- It
may thus be inferred that the Holland case will not preclude a decision by the
Illinois Supreme Court that refusal of a policeman to sign an immunity waiver is
a proper basis for his removal.
z6N.Y. Const. Art. i, § 6.
X7282 N.Y. 166, 25 N.E. 2d 972 (1940).
18 In People v. Harris, 294 N.Y. 424, 63 N.E. 2d 17 (1945), however, it was held permissible
for municipal officers to create a new office for an officer who had been removed pursuant to
this constitutional provision.
'9377 Ill. 346, 36 N.E. 2d 543 (1941).

Ibid., at 348, 545.
"Ibid., at 358, 549.
2 Ibid., at 357, 548.
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